机心的概念(ji鑫機心)Zhuangz我:技术与自然之间的伦理关系。

Krajewska, Krystyna(2012)机心的概念(ji鑫機心)Zhuangz我:技术与自然之间的伦理关系。硕士论文,威尔士大学,三一圣大卫。

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    首先在第一章中,我讨论的评价中国古代理解的人类心脏(鑫心)。它指出了一些无用的途径,这些途径很容易就会出现,因为这些途径涉及到有关思想、情感、身体器官等的观点,因为它们将我们引向二元论的有限维度,即以精神和肉体来描述人类。心的概念概括了人性的所有核心,每个个体都包含人格、心理、生理和行为特征,以及我们更容易在情感领域与之联系的想法。心是影响整个人的能量中心;这种赋予生命的力量很容易被源于对知识的渴求和对世界的分类的思维模式所转移。庄子敦促心是安静,为了找到真正的知识来自先天自然(兴性)。本论文的一个中心前提是,心脏应该被视为定义我们与自然关系的个人轨迹,无论这种关系是共生的、合作的还是以人类为中心的、剥削的。第二章从多种当代伦理视角考察了园丁与自贡的对话。它旨在发现,从今天的角度来看,技术已经成为现代文化的标志,我们可以找到一个分析技术与自然之间的关系,帮助我们理解园丁的激进立场,那些从事与机械注定要建立一个“机心”。第三章探讨了“机”的一部分机心(ji鑫機心)。它探讨了霁的词源(機)为了充分理解这一核心可能需要什么。 The discussion focuses on the idea, proposed by Barry Allen that only certain kinds of machine belong to dao technology. I ask whether there can be a dao technology, given the strictures in the Zhuangzi. In Chapter Four I turn to Heidegger’s analysis of technology as framed in his essay The Question concerning Technology to elucidate the technological mindset that corresponds to the Zhuangzi’s Machine Heart. Heidegger’s premise that we have used technology to work on recalcitrant matter in order to make its hidden essence constantly available for a complex mesh of interrelated human needs may be expressed more coherently and extensively than the ideas contained the Zhuangzi’s parable of the Gardener; however, the underlying concerns are the same. Technology disempowers nature; rivers are not allowed to flow according to their natural rhythms; trees are not allowed to reach maturity; and animals must flee from human beings in order to preserve their lives. In a world so harnessed and forced into the various uniform moulds of technology, human beings can no longer share the rhythms of the cosmos, and imperil their innate inner nature that thrives on a non-acquisitive co-being with the natural world. Chapter Five, the final part of this dissertation, examines how the Zhuangzi depicts the emergence of the Machine Heart from the development of language. I argue that the Zhuangzi’s polemic against Confucian nominalism is connected to two important strands in the text. Firstly, it relates to the idea that the Heart needs to be stilled, to be starved of external stimuli that result in the constant verbal analysis of the world. Secondly, the Zhuangzi associates naming and classifying all entities in the world as a form of harnessing the inner essence or power of the thing. The Zhuangzi, as indeed the Daodejing, both warn against excessive cutting up of reality through language. I conclude the dissertation by commenting on Zhuangzi’s warning that all perspectives and values are relative. Bearing in mind the imperative that technology places on us to value the useful, the Zhuangzi controversially suggests that we may have much to learn by studying the useless.

    项目类型: 论文(硕士)
    附加信息: 系列:Carmarthen / Lampeter dissertation;10412/293。
    不受控制的关键词: 庄子、技术、自然
    主题: B哲学。心理学。宗教B哲学(一般)
    D历史概况和旧世界亚洲
    R医学(普通)
    部门: 毕业论文>硕士论文
    存放用户: 约翰木豆
    把日期: 2014年11月29日13:37
    最后修改: 18 Feb 2016 11:53
    URI: http://repository.www.guaguababy.com/id/eprint/465

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